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Newman v. State, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 24 (filed April 18, 2013)1
CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE – EVIDENCE
CHILD ABUSE – PARENTAL PRIVILEGE – PRIOR-BAD-ACT EVDENCE
Summary
Appeal from a jury conviction in the Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County, of
battery by strangulation and willfully endangering a child as a result of child abuse. The Nevada
Supreme Court addressed two issues both rooted in NRS 48.045’s prohibition against using
character or prior-bad-act evidence to prove criminal propensity. The defendant did not mount a
conventional accidental injury defense to the child abuse charge and admitted to possessing an
aggressive character, eliminating the relevance for evidence showing this to be true.
Disposition/Outcome
Justice Pickering wrote the opinion of the court, with Justice Hardesty concurring and
Justice Cherry concurring in part and dissenting in part. The Court found the trial court
harmlessly erred and the conviction against Mr. Newman was left to stand. The district court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that Newman cuffed his younger son on the back
of his head at a hospital in August 2009, but the other incidents, including nonphysical
arguments and unsubstantiated incidents of child abuse, should not have been allowed. Mr.
Newman did not raise the defenses warranting the State’s admittance of prior-bad-acts nor
character witnesses as to his aggressiveness.
Factual and Procedural History
The morning of September 14, 2009, Shawn Newman followed his twelve-year-old son,
Darian, as the boy rode his bike to school. The route was new and Mr. Newman was making sure
Darian would get to school on time. When the boy could not make his way up a hill, Mr.
Newman left his vehicle to show his son how to use the lower gears on the bicycle. When the
boy slipped off the pedals of the bicycle, Mr. Newman thought his son was lying about being too
tired to go up the hill.
Mr. Newman gave his son the ultimatum of finishing his way to school on the bicycle or
taking a spanking. Darian chose the spanking and readied himself at a wall while his father
began to come at him with a belt. A man named Thomas Carmona saw this happen and
attempted to stop the spanking. Mr. Carmona and Mr. Newman fought. The fight ended when Mr.
Newman choked Mr. Carmona into submission.
At trial, Mr. Newman elected to testify, admitting he could be perceived as an aggressive,
loud, obnoxious kind of person. He admitted to the facts of September 14, 2009, but argued that
Mr. Carmona attacked him, not the reverse. His defense was justification: parental discipline
privilege as to the child abuse charge; and, to some extent, self-defense as to the battery charge.
On cross-examination, the prosecution sought to ask Mr. Newman about various
incidents of abusive or aggressive conduct found in a child protective service (CPS) report. The
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district court admitted the questioning, holding that it tended to show absence of mistake or
accident as to the child abuse charge.
First, the prosecution asked about two incidents that occurred six weeks earlier, when
Darian had appendicitis and was in the hospital. Newman admitted smacking Jacob, Darian’s
younger brother, on the back the head and getting into a heated argument with hospital staff. He
also described his disciplinary parenting style.
The prosecution then asked Newman about two November 2006 and February 2009
incidents with Jacob. These reports were listed as “unsubstantiated” in the CPS report. Newman
said he did not recall either, and the prosecution presented nothing to prove these incidents.
The prosecution then presented a surprise rebuttal witness, Connie Ewing, who reported
that she, too, had a heated but nonphysical exchange with Newman over his disciplining a young
boy outside a local Wal-Mart. The district court allowed this testimony to rebut Newman’s
testimony that he strangled Carmona in self-defense.
Discussion
NRS 48.045(2)
NRS 48.045(2) prohibits the use of evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts . . . to
prove the character of a person.2 However, such evidence “may be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent . . . or absence of mistake or accident.”3 In order for
such an admission, the prosecutor must establish that “(1) the prior bad act is relevant to the
crime charged and for a purpose other than proving the defendant’s propensity, (2) the act is
proven by clear and convincing evidence, and (3) the probative value of the evidence is not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”4
Relevance and Non-Propensity Purpose
The district court allowed evidence of Newman’s prior bad acts involving Jacob to show
absence of mistake or accident. However, Newman did not mount a conventional accidental
injury defense. Neither mistake nor accident was at issue, and so the prior acts involving Jacob
should not have been admitted for that purpose. However, the prosecution argued the prior-badact evidence involving Jacob was admissible to refute Newman’s parental privilege defense by
demonstrating that Newman did not have the intent to correct that forms the heart of that defense.
Nevada has not codified the parental privilege defense, while a number of states have. In
Nevada, the privilege exists by virtue of common law5 and the “fundamental liberty interest [a
parent has] in maintaining a familial relationship with his or her child [which includes] the
right . . . ‘to direct the upbringing and education of children.’”6 That defense requires the
prosecution to establish that a parent did not intend to merely discipline his child, but to injure or
endanger him. “A parent who disciplines a child in a physical manner intends to correct or alter
2
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their child’s behavior. That corrective intent is lacking in a battery.”7 “Often the only way to
determine whether the punishment is an . . . act of discipline that was unintentionally harsh or
whether it constitutes the crime of child abuse is to look at the parent’s history of disciplining the
child.” 8 Here, the district court failed to identify the relevant non-propensity purpose for
admitting evidence of the prior incidents. Nevertheless, the evidence did have probative value in
assessing Newman’s intent.
Clear and Convincing Evidence, Probative Value, and the Incidents Involving Jacob
Identification of an at-issue, non-propensity purpose for admitting prior-bad-act evidence
is a necessary first step of any NRS 48.045(2) analysis.9 In addition, the prosecution must
establish the prior bad act by clear and convincing evidence and demonstrate that its probative
value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.10
Judged by these standards, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
evidence that Newman had previously struck Jacob at the hospital. That incident had enough
probative value to justify admission, and as Newman admitted to hitting Jacob, it was also
proven by clear and convincing evidence.
However, the same cannot be said of the November 2006 and February 2009 incidents.
The prosecution did not show by clear and convincing evidence that those incidents could be
substantiated.
Clear and Convincing Evidence, Probative Value, and the Incidents of Verbal Aggression
It was also error for the district court to admit the evidence that Newman was aggressive
to hospital staff and Ewing under NRS 48.045(2). Neither of these incidents had any logical
relevance to Newman’s parental privilege defense, and both were too factually dissimilar to the
battery-by-strangulation charge to refute Newman’s claim of self defense.
NRS 48.045(1)(A)
NRS 48.045(1)(A) permits the prosecution to offer similar evidence to rebut evidence
offered by an accused of a person’s character or a trait of his or her character. Under the
collateral-fact rule, extrinsic evidence, other than a conviction may not be offered to impeach a
defendant’s character evidence11, except when the State “seeks to introduce evidence on rebuttal
to contradict specific factual assertions raised during the accused’s direct examination.”12
Here, the district court admitted Ewing’s testimony to rebut character evidence from
Newman and found the collateral-fact rule didn’t apply. That decision was erroneous for three
reasons. First, Ewing’s testimony did not rebut character evidence. Newman admitted to having
an aggressive temperament. Newman did not claim to be peace-loving or nonviolent, so the crux
of Ewing’s testimony focusing on Newman’s violent nature was pointless. Second, evidence of
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Newman’s character was collateral. Verbal combativeness was not an issue. Third, Ewing’s
testimony did not comply with the requirements of NRS 48.055. Ewing did not give an opinion
or discuss Newman’s reputation. It is improper to use evidence of specific acts that the accused
has not previously being confronted with.15 Ewing discussed a specific instance of conduct that
was not, and could not have been, previously raised by Newman or explored by the prosecution
in its cross-examination of him.
Harmless-Error
Non-constitutional errors are deemed harmless unless they have a “substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”16 Here, the error in allowing the
prosecution to ask Newman about the November 2006 and February 2009 incidents was
harmless. They jury heard nothing about those incidents beyond the fact that Newman could not
recall them. Additionally, the jury was instructed not to speculate that insinuations suggested by
a question are true. Finally, given Newman’s own frank admissions and overwhelming evidence
on the child abuse charge, the error cannot be said to have had a substantial and injurious effect
on the verdict.
Likewise, the error in admitting the testimony of Ewing and evidence of the hospital
confrontation was also harmless. Newman’s battery conviction rested on his own testimony,
corroborated by numerous eyewitnesses, that he strangled Carmona. Additionally, his defense
was primarily built around lack of bodily harm, and only minimally on self-defense. Furthermore,
the prosecution made almost no use of the Ewing testimony. Thus, admitting both pieces of
evidence was a harmless error.
Conclusion
Newman’s conviction is affirmed. The court erred in admitting numerous pieces of
evidence, but hose evidentiary errors did not taint the accused’s right to a fair trial.
Justice Cherry, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
The analysis of these errors by the majority is outstanding and can be considered a
landmark holding in the often-contested area of NRS 48.045’s prohibition against using
character or prior-bad-act testimony to prove criminal responsibility. The problem with the
majority’s decision is holding these errors were harmless. Mr. Newman should be granted a new
trial. Looking ahead at the long run view, fixing these errors now and retrying cases correctly
will foster fairness and a closer watch against errors.17
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